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Summary
If thinking about weapons, one generally thinks about lethal technology. 
However, an abundance of so-called non-lethal weapons, a technology not 
aimed at killing but merely incapacitating the human target or military objective, 
is also being deployed both within and outside the ambit of armed conflict. Since 
non-lethal weapons do not necessarily implicate a zero chance of mortality, but 
often lead to severe wounds and tremendous suffering, the use and deployment 
of such weapons raise strong humanitarian and human rights concerns. 
The prohibition to cause superfluous injuries and unnecessary suffering, as well 
as the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks are, amongst others, one of the most 
relevant provisions potentially having an influence on the deployment of non-
lethal technology in armed conflict. However, the invocation of the principle of 
proportionality may lead to the justification of the use of non-lethal weapons 
on the grounds that the military advantage anticipated was greater than the 
human suffering caused. Insofar, one must ask whether there is a “red-line”; 
where the almost inflationary invocation of the principle of proportionality may 
defeat the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions and therefore render 
the deployment and use of non-lethal technology illegal.
Apart from the battlefield, non-lethal weapons are also being deployed in law-
enforcement scenarios, where human rights law plays a pivotal role. In this 
regard, one must not look merely at the prohibition of torture and inhuman 
or degrading suffering and the right to life but also at the right to health, a 
presumably underestimated principle curbing and shaping the use of non-lethal 
technology outside the ambit of armed conflict. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Usually, people associate weapons with lethal technology being deployed 
by various actors in different scenarios, such as the military in armed conflict 
or police officers during law enforcement as a means of last resort. However, 
a significant number of weapons are used for military and policing purposes, 
which both academia and practitioners refer to as “non-lethal” or “less-lethal”. 
Tasers, a conducted electrical device, water cannons and dazzling laser weapons 
are prominent examples of such “non-lethal” technology. Even though countries 
promote strongly the deployment of such technology as a more human alternative 
to lethal force, history has shown that non-lethal weapons do not necessarily 
implicate a zero chance of mortality. On the contrary, many “non-lethal” weapons 
have caused death or unnecessary and exceedingly intense suffering, in turn raising 
strong humanitarian and human rights concerns. 
This paper aims at analyzing how Public International Law (PIL) responds to 
non-lethal weapons, especially with regard to humanitarian law and human rights 
obligations. Most of all, two specific problems arising with regard to the use of non-
lethal weapons will be addressed. First, the role of the principle of proportionality 
in humanitarian law in case of deployment of non-lethal weapons will be examined. 
In this regard, it must be noted that many humanitarian provisions, such as the 
prohibition to cause superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering or the prohibition 
of indiscriminate attacks, may be justified by the invocation of the principle of 
proportionality, especially when it comes to the use of non-lethal technology. This 
begs the question, whether there are cases where the principle of proportionality 
cannot be invoked in case of non-lethal weapons deployment. Second, the right to 
health, which has not been addressed in connection with the deployment of non-
lethal weapons extensively so far, will be analyzed with a view to determining 
the meaning and relevance of the right to health for the deployment of non-lethal 
technology. 
It is noteworthy that authors dealt with non-lethal weapons and PIL before 
but mainly before and after the year of 2000. Insofar, a more or less unsatisfactory 
state of legal science can be observed. In the meanwhile, many non-lethal weapons 
have been developed rising more and new humanitarian and human rights concerns. 
Furthermore, new treaties entered into force and international courts dealt with 
different types of weapons in their jurisprudence, most notably the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). These developments will have to be taken into 
consideration in order to find adequate answers to the questions raised before. 
From a practical perspective, it must be noted that not only non-lethal weapons 
currently being deployed lead to severe and sometimes long-lasting suffering and 
human rights violations, but many countries currently invest significant amounts of 
money in the development of new non-lethal technology. From the perspective of 
PIL, the risks emanating from these new weapons can only be limited adequately 
by conducting research in order to find answers to the challenges lying ahead. 
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Against this backdrop, it is of pivotal importance to analyze the actual status quo 
of non-lethal weapons from the perspective of both humanitarian and human rights 
law. The two special topics addressed in this paper shall exemplify the complexity 
of legal norms encasing non-lethal weapons both in humanitarian and human 
rights law. Before embarking on details, a short introduction on the development, 
definition and categorization shall ensure clarity on this subject.
2. DEVELOPMENT, DEFINITION AND CATEGORIZATION OF 
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
The concept of non-lethal weapons is not a new phenomenon. On the contrary, 
the earliest incident of the deployment of non-lethal weapons was the fall of the 
almost impenetrable wall of Jericho around 1400 BC, when high noises emanated 
from horns bringing down the wall and exposing the meaningful city.1 In academic 
terms, the concept of non-lethal weapons developed in the 1960s,2 when the first riot 
control agents were deployed for policing scenarios. At that time, civil disobedience, 
protests and demonstrations were on the rise putting a strain on public security 
and safety.3 From the late 1990s onwards, the United States, one of the biggest 
producers of non-lethal technology, started to use the term “non-lethal weapon” in 
their weapons program on a regular basis and many other states followed in doing 
so. Their aim was to develop, stockpile or transfer weapons, whose primary purpose 
was not to kill but to merely incapacitate the human target or destroy the military 
objective. Non-lethal technology should serve as an alternative to lethal force4 and 
therefore contribute to the humanization of warfare.5 On the other side, the use of 
non-lethal weapons should be enhanced in law enforcement scenarios in order to 
guarantee security and crowd control on the one hand and avoid escalation of the 
use of force with a view to adhering to human rights obligations, on the other hand.6 
As a result, significant research on the development of non-lethal technology, on 
their potential use and health related issues occurring in case of non-lethal weapons 
deployment, had been conducted by the United States, most notably by the Joint 
1. Alexander, John B., Future Warfare – Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-first Century Warfare, 
New York City, Thomas Dunne, 1999, p. 95. 
2  Kaurin, Pauline M., The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare, New York, 
Routledge, 2014, p. 57. 
3  Davison, Neil, Non-Lethal Weapons, New York City, Palgrave McMillan, 2009, p. 12. 
4  Rappert, Brian, Non-Lethal Weapons as Legitimizing Forces?, London, Frank Cass, 2003, p. 
18. 
5  Mégret, Frédéric, The Debate on Non-Lethal Weapons: Why Wound and Kill At All?, 
Canadian Red Cross, <http://www.croixrouge.ca/cmslib/general/oteoc_megret.pdf>, 22nd 
of January 2017; Meron, Theodor, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, The American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 94, 2/2000, pp. 239 – 278. 
6  Dymond-Bass, Abi/Corney, Neil, The Use of “Less-Lethal” Weapons in Law Enforcement, 
in: Casey-Maslen, Stuart (ed.), Weapons and International Human Rights Law, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 33. 
834
E. HOFFBERGER, Non-Lethal Weapons: The Principle of Proportionality...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. Rij. (1991) v. 38, br. 2, 831-853 (2017) 
Non-Lethal Weapons Program. Other countries followed the same direction by 
investing vast amounts of money in the development of non-lethal technology, such 
as Russia, China, Israel, France and South-Africa.7 The increased deployment of 
non-lethal technology both in military and policing contexts raised the attention 
of international lawyers trying to find out how to deal with non-lethal weapons, 
amongst others, from the perspective of humanitarian and human rights law. 
Despite the increased interest in non-lethal weapons, no commonly accepted 
definition of the term “non-lethal weapon”8 emerged. In default of an official legal 
definition, both academia and practice refer to the definition provided for by the 
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) respectively.9 
According to the United States Department of Defense, non-lethal weapons are “[e]
xplicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or materiel 
immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and 
undesired damage to property, facilities, materiel, and the environment.”10 
NATO provides for a similar definition of non-lethal weapons, according 
to which “[n]on-lethal weapons are weapons which are explicitly designed and 
developed to incapacitate or repel personnel, with a low probability of fatality 
or permanent injury, or to disable equipment, with minimal undesired damage or 
impact on the environment.”11 
Both definitions indicate that non-lethal weapons can either be deployed 
against humans or against objects. While so-called anti-personnel non-lethal 
weapons aim at incapacitating the person targeted, anti-materiél weapons are 
being used with a view to damaging vehicles or whole facilities, such as power 
plants.12 Furthermore, anti-personnel weapons unfold their effects directly but 
anti-materiél non-lethal weapons cause indirect effects. While exposure to pepper 
spray, an anti-personnel non-lethal weapon dispersing the chemical agent capsaicin, 
leads to mucosal irritation, increased lachrymation, tracheal cough, disorientation 
and even asphyxiation by irritating pain receptors of the nervous system, the M2 
vehicle lightweight arresting device net, an anti-materiél weapon rendering vehicles 
immovable by a net stretching over the vehicle, might endanger the life, health or 
safety of the car driver himself, fellow passengers or innocent bystanders in case 
of improper deployment and thus creates indirect effects. Insofar, it is of pivotal 
importance not only to evaluate the legal implications arising with regard to anti-
7  Davison, N., op. cit., p. 35.
8  Casey-Maslen, Stuart, Non-Kinetic Energy Weapons termed “Non-Lethal”, Geneva Academy 
of International Humanitarian Law, 10/2010, <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/apr/
non-kinetic-energy-weapons-casey-maslen-2010>.pdf, 17th of January 2017.
9  Dymond-Bass, A./Corney, N., op. cit., p. 32. 
10  United States Department of Defense Directive, Number 3000.03E, 13th of April 2013, 
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300003p.pdf>, 17th of January 2017. 
11  NATO Policy on non-lethal weapons, NATO Press statements, 13th of October 1999, <http://
www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p991013e.htm>, 22nd of January, 2017. 
12  Lewer, Nick/Schofield, Steven, Non-Lethal Weapons: A Fatal Attraction?, London, Zed 
Books, 1997, p. 10. 
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personnel but also with regard to anti-materiél non-lethal weapons. Moreover, these 
two examples show that despite the rather euphemistic labelling, non-lethal weapons 
do not entail a zero chance of mortality. On the contrary, even apparently non-lethal 
weapons may cause severe adverse health effects or even death.13 When non-lethal 
rubber bullets were used in Northern Ireland by police officers to shut down turmoil 
in the 1970s, many people died or were heavily wounded by rubber bullets hitting 
sensitive body parts, such as the ocular system or the temple.14 Therefore, even 
though the term “non-lethal” may indicate the cause of less harm, special attention 
must be paid to the relevant repercussions on health and the overall wellbeing 
of each person affected by a non-lethal weapon. Even though some weapons are 
being clearly designated as “non-lethal”, their effects may be far-reaching. Given 
the high risks on human health caused by non-lethal technology, several Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and authors stated that the term “non-lethal” 
is a misleading moniker.15 Instead, terms like “less-lethal”, “less-than lethal”, 
“soft-kill”, “sub-lethal” or “pre-lethal”, were prioritized emphasizing the possible 
dangerous and sometimes even fatal effects of non-lethal technology.16 Until today, 
no common agreement has been found which term shall be given preference. While 
the United States (US) favor the term “non-lethal”, most NGOs prefer “less-than-
lethal” or “less-lethal”. However, answering this question is merely interesting on 
an academic level, but it is not relevant for practical purposes, since all terms aim 
at describing the same types of weapons. In this paper, the term “non-lethal” will be 
used since most states, with the US leading the way, refer to “non-lethal” weapons. 
More importantly, the vast abundance of non-lethal technology nowadays 
available has to be addressed adequately. Therefore, non-lethal weapons were 
divided into different categories based on their relevant effects. According to Fidler, 
non-lethal weapons may be classified into acoustic, biological, chemical, digital, 
electrical, electromagnetic, environmental, kinetic, optical and psychological 
weapons.17 One of the main reasons for the significant number of different non-
lethal weapons available today is that non-lethal weapons are being deployed in 
many different scenarios. Not only do non-lethal weapons offer support in classical 
policing scenarios including riot control and law enforcement, but they are also 
relevant in custodial centers, armed conflict and peacekeeping operations, imposing 
different requirements on non-lethal weapons and the military commanders using 
them. 
13  Madea, Burkhard, Handbook of Forensic Medicine, West Sussex, Wiley Backwell, 2014, pp. 
483 – 484. 
14  Burrows, Collin, Operationalizing Non-Lethality: A Northern Ireland Perspective, in: Lewer, 
Nick (ed.), The Future of Non-Lethal Weapons, Frank Cass, London, 2002, p. 104. 
15  Fidler, David P., The Meaning of Moscow: “Non-lethal” weapons and international law in the 
21st century, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 87, 859/2005, p. 529. 
16  Rappert, Brian, Towards an Understanding of Non-Lethality, in: Lewer, Nick (ed.), The 
Future of Non-Lethal Weapons, London, Frank Cass, 2002, p. 53. 
17  Fidler, David P., The International Legal Implications of Non-Lethal Weapons, Michigan 
Journal of International Law, vol. 21, 51/2001, p. 53. 
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3. NON-LETHAL WEAPONS AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW
One could argue that the legal provisions applicable to non-lethal weapons are 
fragmented.18 There are three different legally binding regimes dealing with non-
lethal technology or at least affecting their potential use in different ways.19 While 
arms control treaties regulate the use, deployment, stockpiling and transfer of 
specific types of weapons,20 humanitarian law does not address specific weapons per 
se but provides an abundance of general provisions also relevant for the deployment 
of weapons in armed conflict.21 Human rights treaties neither address specific 
weapons explicitly but most documents comprise fundamental rights and values for 
each human being promoting respect for and adherence of human rights standards 
by the states and the international community respectively, which, without doubt, 
have relevance for non-lethal technology.22 Even though one might argue that non-
lethal weapons and PIL are characterized by fragmentation, the ongoing process 
of further constitutionalization of the world order and the international community 
18  For more details on PIL and fragmentation see Koskenniemi, Martti/Leino Päivi, 
Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 15/2002, pp. 553–579. 
19  However, there is a vast amount of soft-law applicable to non-lethal weapons, such as the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners as of 1955, the Code of Conduct for 
Law Enforcement Officials as of 1979, the Procedure for the Effective Implementation of the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners as of 1984, the Basic Principles for 
the Treatment of Prisoners as of 1990, the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms 
as of 1990 and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners – revision process 
of 2012. ECOSOC Resolution 663 c (XXIV) of 31st of July 1957 and 2076 (LXII), 13th of 
May 1977; Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners; General Assembly 
Resolution 34/169, 17th of December 1979.
20  Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 2nd 
of December 1983, UNTS vol. 1342 no. 22495; Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments 
(Protocol I), 2nd of December 1983, UNTS vol. 1342 no. 22495; Protocol on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3rd of 
May 1996 (Protocol II, as amended on 3rd of May 1996), 3rd of December 1998, UNTS vol. 
2048 no. 22495; Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 
(Protocol III), 2nd of December 1983, UNTS vol. 1342 no. 22495; Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects 
(Protocol IV, entitled Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons), 30st of July 1998, UNTS vol. 
1380 no. 22495; Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol V), 30st of July 1998, UNTS 
vol. 2399 no. 22495.
21  Dinstein, Yoram, The Conduct of Hostilities, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004, 
p. 60. 
22  Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution, 
3/217 A (III), 10th of December 1948. 
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as such also affects non-lethal weapons.23 The three relevant legal regimes are 
components of one system being highly interconnected and interlinked with each 
other pursuing the purpose of reducing the suffering of people caused by the use of 
certain weapons. 
 3.1. Non-Lethal Weapons and Humanitarian Law
There is an abundance of treaties in the field of humanitarian law and an 
enumeration and careful analysis thereof would go far beyond the scope of this 
paper. Attention will be exclusively paid to the Four Geneva Conventions (GC) of 
194924 and Additional Protocols (AP)25 of 1977, most notably AP I, relating to the 
protection of victims of international armed conflict. 
Even though the GC of 1949 and AP I and II do not address certain types 
of weapons directly, several provisions are relevant for non-lethal technology.26 
The most important principles having relevance for non-lethal weapons are the 
prohibition of superfluous injuries and unnecessary suffering, the prohibition 
of indiscriminate attacks and the related principle of distinction, as well as the 
principle of proportionality and the regulations on combatants hors de combat.27 It 
will be shown that the principle of proportionality will pose the most challenges 
as to the regulation of non-lethal technology and evoke the most significant legal 
repercussions. 
23  Klabbers, Jan, et al., The Constitutionalization of International Law, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2009, p. 49. 
24  Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949, 21st of October 1950, UNTS vol. 75 no. 970; Geneva 
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949, 21st of October 1950, UNTS vol. 75, no. 971; 
Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949, 21st of October 
1950, UNTS vol. 75 no. 972; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, 1949, 21st of October 1950, UNTS vol. 75, no. 973.
25  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12th of August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8th of June 1977, UNTS 
vol. 1125, no. 17512; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12th of August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
8th of June 1977, UNTS vol. 1125, no. 17513.
26  Messingham, Eve, Conflict without casualties…a note of caution: non-lethal weapons and 
international humanitarian law, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 94, 886/2012, 
p. 677.
27  Casey-Maslen, Stuart/Weill, Sharon, The Use of Weapons in Armed Conflict, in: Casey-
Maslen, Stuart (ed.), Weapons and International Human Rights Law, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2014, pp. 262 – 281. 
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3.1.1. Prohibition of superfluous injuries and unnecessary suffering 
The prohibition to cause superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering is one 
of the most prominent provisions in humanitarian law.28 Enshrined in Art 35 para 2 
AP I GC, the provision prohibits the deployment of weapons, projectiles, material 
and the application of methods of warfare causing exceedingly intense harm. 
However, there is no conclusive and all-encompassing answer as to the question 
which weapons exactly do fall under this provision.29 According to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), incendiary weapons, blinding laser weapons, 
anti-personnel mines and biological as well as chemical weapons, have already been 
cited frequently as weapons causing superfluous injuries and unnecessary suffering 
by several states. However, state practice is still too inconsistent in order to assume 
that a general rule developed according to which all of these weapons constitute 
weapons causing superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering.30 Furthermore, the 
mere enumeration of diverse examples of weapons that fall under the category of 
Art 35 para 2 AP I,31 does not give an answer if non-lethal weapons are affected 
by the prohibition to cause superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering. In this 
regard, the ICRC’s opinion on Art 35 para 2 AP I and the Commentary on AP I 
need to be analyzed more closely. According to the ICRC, in order to determine 
whether a weapon violates the prohibition to cause superfluous injuries or 
unnecessary suffering, the effects of a weapon need to be taken into consideration, 
not the intent of the producer or user.32 This could mean, that non-lethal weapons 
whose effects are comparable to those of lethal weapons already violating Art 35 
para 2 AP I,33 are infringing upon the prohibition to cause superfluous injuries or 
unnecessary suffering, such as biological and chemical weapons.34 The idea of 
referring to existing arms control treaties in order to evaluate which (non-lethal) 
weapons constitute weapons causing superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering 
28  Durham, Helen/McCormack Timothy L.H., The Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy 
of International Humanitarian Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1999, p. 71. 
29  Crowe, Jonathan/Weston-Scheuber, Kylie, Principles of International Humanitarian Law, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013, pp. 51 – 57. 
30  Henckaerts, Jean-Marie/Doswald-Beck, Louise, Customary Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2015, pp. 243 – 244. 
31  With critical remarks see Parks, Hays, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 8/2005, pp. 86 – 87.
32  Coupland, Robin/Herby, Peter, Review of the Legality of Weapons: A New Approach: The 
SIrUS Project, International Review of the Red Cross, 1999, p. 835. 
33  It must be borne in mind that state practice is very inconsistent as to which weapons definitely 
violate Art 35 para 2 AP I. See Henckaerts, J.M., Doswald-Beck, L., op. cit., p. 273. However, 
there are reasonable arguments to conclude that the strong condemnation of certain types of 
weapons, such as chemical weapons and public outcry in case of their deployment constitute 
weapons causing superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering. Rehman, Javaid, International 
Human Rights Law, Edinburgh, Longman Publishers, 2010, p. 790. 
34  Henckaerts, J.M, Doswald-Beck, L., op. cit., pp. 243 – 244. See also the ICRC’s Commentary 
on AP I 1419, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=A1D
622EE77F6964A41256650004C9909&action=openDocument>, 22nd of January 2017. With 
critical remarks see Parks, H., op. cit., pp. 86 – 87. 
839
E. HOFFBERGER, Non-Lethal Weapons: The Principle of Proportionality...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. Rij. (1991) v. 38, br. 2, 831-853 (2017) 
is supported by Art 31 para 3 lit c VCLT35,which reads as follows: “[t]here shall be 
taken into account, together with the context (…) any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.”36 The provision of Art 31 
reflects the ongoing process of constitutionalization in PIL by taking a systemic 
approach in treaty interpretation. Art 31 clearly considers PIL as a common legal 
system where legal regimes are interconnected and complement each other. As 
early as in Wimbledon, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) held 
that treaties must be interpreted by referring to other treaties having the same object 
and purpose.37Hays rejects the idea of referring to arms control treaties in order to 
further interpret Art 35 para 2 AP I on the grounds, that arms control treaties and 
the prohibition to cause superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering do not have 
the same object and purpose in common. While arms control treaties have, as their 
purpose, the prohibition of certain types of weapons, AP I pursues the protection 
of civilians in warfare in general.38 This argument can be countered by referring to 
the commentary of the VCLT, which states that Art 31 para 3 lit c VCLT “[m]ust be 
taken to refer to all recognized sources of international law the emanations of which 
can in principle be of assistance in the process of interpretation.”39 The word in 
principle indicates that relevant treaties serving as a helpful means of interpretation 
must not necessarily pursue an identical object and purpose, but the overall 
similarities have to be taken into account. The only case where an identical object 
and purpose is required to fill a regulatory gap is the invocation of analogy. It could 
be argued that arms control treaties may be used in order to interpret Art 35 para 2 
AP I per analogiam. In this regard, it has to be taken into consideration that analogy 
in PIL may be applied only exceptionally requiring that the states parties concerned 
agreed on the analogous application of treaties in order to fill regulatory gaps. In 
this case, a more or less identical object and purpose would indeed be required.40 
However, one must not resort to analogy if better instruments, such as the systemic 
interpretation according to Art 31 para 3 lit c VCLT, are available requiring merely 
that the relevant treaty in principle is of assistance in the process of interpretation.
In light of the aforementioned it could be argued that in applying a systemic 
interpretation, non-lethal weapons already covered by arms control treaties or whose 
effects are comparable to those regulated by arms control treaties, at the same time 
constitute weapons which cause superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering. 
However, generally Art 35 para 2 AP I may be justified by the principle of 
proportionality,41 a doctrine most widely known in humanitarian law by requiring 
35  Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 23rd of May1969, UNTS vol. 1155 no. 18232.
36  See also Dörr Oliver/Schmalenbach Kirsten, Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 
A Commentary, Heidelberg, Springer, 2012, Art 31, p. 131. 
37  PCIJ, Case of the S.S. Wimbledon, 17th of August 1923, PCIJ Reports 1923, pp. 23 – 25. 
38  Parks, H., op. cit., p. 86 – 87
39  Dörr, O./Schmalenbach, K., op. cit., p. 561.
40  Ipsen, Knut, Völkerrecht, München, CH Beck, 2014, p. 501.
41  Sassòli, Marco/Olson, Laura M., The relationship between humanitarian law and human 
rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international 
armed conflict, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 90, 871/2008, p. 606. 
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states to strike a balance between the injuries caused to civilians and the concrete 
military advantage anticipated.42 In case of non-lethal weapons deployment, the 
invocation of this principle will in almost all scenarios lead to the fact that a weapon 
is not deemed to cause superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering because it was 
proportionate in relation to the military advantage anticipated.43 However, there are 
arguments to assume that the principle of proportionality cannot be invoked without 
limits if the invocation may lead to the complete erosion of Art 35 para 2 AP I and 
contradict the object and purpose of AP I GC as a whole.44 In other words, it could 
be argued that Art 35 para 2 AP I consists of an incontestable nucleus which cannot 
be derogated from by the invocation of the principle of proportionality. Without 
doubt, one of the main objects and purposes of the GC and AP I is to guarantee the 
utmost protection of civilians in armed conflict.45 In order to better understand the 
object and purpose of AP I GC, one must have a closer look at Art 31 para 3 lit c 
VCLT, again. The provision stipulates that in order to interpret treaty provisions, 
other relevant treaties may be taken into account.46 In case of AP I GC, arms control 
treaties may serve as a source of interpretation. Arms control treaties pursue, as their 
overall purpose, the mitigation of suffering caused by weapons in armed conflict. 
For example, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention pursues, as its purpose, “to 
put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines”,47 whereas 
the Chemical Weapons Convention has as its object and purpose the elimination 
of chemical weapons and the prohibition of their deployment,48 which arguably 
implies that suffering caused from such weapons shall be mitigated in order to 
protect civilians. As regards the Conventional Weapons Convention, it could be 
argued that its purpose is to protect civilians from intense and exceedingly injurious 
suffering.49 Referring to arms control treaties in order to locate the immutable and 
incontrovertible core of Art 35 para 2 AP I, where the invocation of the principle of 
proportionality would clearly contradict the object and purpose of the GC as a whole, 
does not necessitate that the relevant treaties have, as their object and purpose, the 
42  The wording of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion reiterates the principle of proportionality in stating that superfluous injuries or 
unnecessary suffering is “harm greater than the unavoidable to achieve legitimate military 
objectives”, ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8th of 
July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226. 
43  Fidler, D., The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal Weapons“, cit., p. 44. 
44  Art 31 para 1 VCLT.
45  Boothby, William H., Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 20162, p. 51. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Preamble Anti-Personnel Mine Convention. See also Casey-Maslen, Stuart, Commentaries 
on Arms Control Treaties, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 288 – 289. 
48  Klebbers, Jan, Strange Bedfellows: The “Interim Obligation” and the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention, in: Myer, Eric (ed.), Issues of Arms Control and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001, pp.18 – 22. 
49  Corten, Oliver/Klein, Pierre, The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, A 
Commentary, Vol. 1, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 505.
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mitigation of the suffering caused by weapons leading to superfluous injuries and 
unnecessary suffering. The overall object and purpose of arms control treaties as 
to protect civilians from suffering in general arguably suffices in order to refer to 
such treaties when interpreting Art 35 para 2 AP I.50 Therefore, the invocation of the 
principle of proportionality in a scenario where non-lethal weapons were deployed 
already covered by existing arms control treaties (which, by the way, in their treaty 
texts do not allow for a justification by the application of a proportionality test), 
may defeat the very purpose of the AP I itself.51 Insofar, non-lethal weapons covered 
by arms control treaties (such as riot control agents and non-lethal anti-personnel 
mines) are weapons causing superfluous injuries and unnecessary suffering and 
must not be justified by the invocation of the principle of proportionality.
3.1.2. Prohibition of indiscriminate attacks
Another principle of humanitarian law relevant for non-lethal weapons is 
the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, which has to be read in context with the 
principle of distinction.52 Parties to a conflict must, within their attacks, differentiate 
clearly between civilians and combatants and civilian objects and military 
objectives.53 In the same direction argues Art 51 para 4 AP I GC prohibiting attacks 
which cannot be directed at a military objective or a combatant.54 It could be argued, 
for example, that the Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), an acoustic weapon 
emitting shrill noises aimed at dispersing crowds of people used in armed conflict, 
contradicts the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, since the weapon cannot be 
used in such a way as to distinguish between civilians and combatants properly.55 
Indeed, LRAD has a certain reach but within this reach, no differentiation can be 
made between civilians and combatants.56 
As in the case of the prohibition to cause superfluous injuries or unnecessary 
suffering, the principle of proportionality must be taken into consideration.57 
However, whereas Art 35 AP I itself does not entail a “proportionality-test”, Art 51 
para 5 lit b states clearly that the principle of proportionality needs to be taken into 
account: “[a]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
50  Dörr O./Schmalenbach K., op. cit., p. 561. 
51  With critical remarks see Parks, H., op. cit., pp. 86 – 87. 
52  Sandoz, Yves, International Humanitarian Law in the 21st Century, in: McCormack, Thomas 
(ed.), Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, TMC Asser Press, 2003, p. 6. 
53  Casey-Maslen, Stuart/Weill Sharon, The Use of Weapons in Armed Conflict, cit., p. 262. 
54  Lachenmann, Frauke/Wolfrum, Rüdiger, The Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Force: 
The Max Planck Enzyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2017, p. 498. 
55  Davison, N., op. cit., p. 196. 
56  Dymond-Bass, A./Corney, N, op. cit., p. 42. 
57  With critical remarks see Crowe, J./Weston-Scheuber, K., op. cit., p. 59. 
842
E. HOFFBERGER, Non-Lethal Weapons: The Principle of Proportionality...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. Rij. (1991) v. 38, br. 2, 831-853 (2017) 
anticipated.” With regard to non-lethal weapons, the invocation of the principle 
of proportionality might relatively often lead to the fact that the prohibition of 
indiscriminate attacks is not being violated.58 Thus, the question rises, whether 
humanitarian law allows for the invocation of the principle of proportionality in all 
cases or whether there is a “red line”, which must not be trespassed. Formulated 
differently: In which scenarios military necessity cannot justify the deployment of 
indiscriminate non-lethal weapons? 
In order to answer this question, one must look at human rights law, most 
notably the prohibition of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment.59 This 
principle applies in all circumstances, that is to say, within and outside the ambit 
of armed conflict.60 It requires that states abstain from any measures that could lead 
to the torture, inhuman or degrading treatment of individual persons or the whole 
population. Nowadays, the prohibition of torture is being considered ius cogens,61 a 
right which cannot be derogated from.62 It applies in any circumstances, independent 
whether states have ratified relevant international conventions, such as the UN-
Convention against Torture63, or not.64 Thus, there is a “red line”, according to which 
military necessity cannot justify the deployment of indiscriminate weapons. Without 
doubt, the prohibition of torture marks the “red line”, where military commanders 
have to abstain from using certain types of weapons. According to Art 53 VCLT, 
a treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of PIL. Even though AP I 
itself does not per se conflict with a norm of ius cogens, the relationship between 
the principle of proportionality and the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks has to 
be interpreted in such a way as it is compatible with existing peremptory norms of 
international law.65
However, this leaves the question unanswered, what kind of weapons amount 
to torture, especially when it comes non-lethal weapons and armed conflict. 
Generally it can be observed, that the duration and intensity of exposure to a weapon 
plays a fundamental role in assessing whether the deployment of certain non-lethal 
weapons constitutes torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.66 In the end, a 
case-by-case assessment will be necessary evaluating in each situation, whether or 
not the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment has been violated. 
58  Fidler, D., The International Legal Implications, cit., p. 83 – 84. 
59  Murray, Daragh, Practitioner’s Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2016, p. 127. 
60  Henckaerts J.M.,Doswald-Beck, L., op. cit., p. 214. 
61  De Wet, Erika, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of jus cogens, Journal of 
International Law, 15/2004, p.121. 
62  Weatherall, Thomas, Ius Cogens: International Law and Social Contract, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 390. 
63  United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Degrading or Inhuman Treatment, 10th 
of December 1984, UNTS vol. 1465 no. 24841.
64  Henckaerts, J.M., Doswald-Beck, L., op. cit., p. 214. 
65  Dörr, O./Schmalenbach K., op. cit., pp. 897 – 942. 
66  Murray, D., op. cit., 127; Lewer, N, The Future of Non-Lethal Weapons, cit., p. 82; Davison, 
N, op. cit., p. 21. 
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The shutting down of electricity plants by non-lethal anti-materiél indiscriminate 
weapons leading to starvation, pain and death has been considered as amounting to 
torture, for example.67 
In light of the aforementioned one can conclude that not only the principle 
of proportionality influences significantly the prohibition to cause unnecessary 
suffering and superfluous injuries but also the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. 
In this regard, Art 53 VCLT requires that the prohibition of torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment, a peremptory norm of PIL, is being taken into account 
constituting the “red line”, where military necessity cannot justify the deployment 
of indiscriminate (non-lethal) weapons. 
3.1.3. Persons Hors de Combat 
According to Art 41 AP I GC persons hors de combat must not be attacked. 
This provision constitutes one of the most important provisions in humanitarian law 
limiting and curbing the use of non-lethal weapons.68 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that a significant number of non-lethal weapons 
were used by military commanders with the aim to enhance the effectivity of lethal 
weapons. For example, a dazzle grenade aimed at causing temporary blindness, may 
be used with a view to incapacitating combatants which then can be shot without 
causing higher risks to the own military division. Such behavior clearly contradicts 
Art 41 AP I GC but has occurred many times in international and non-international 
armed conflict. In case an enemy combatant has been incapacitated by the use of 
non-lethal technology, the armed forces having deployed such weapons must 
undertake anything to take care of the person injured.69 Insofar, the deployment 
of non-lethal weapons is being heavily restrained by Art 41 requiring states to 
refrain from attacking enemy combatants hors de combat (negative duty) and to 
take positive measures in order to ensure the safety and protection of such persons 
(positive duty). At the same time, armed forces must ensure that persons hors de 
combat will not constitute a military threat in the future.70 Therefore, the deployment 
of non-lethal weapons only has limited significance in wartime scenarios directly 
aimed at targeting enemy combatants. Considerably more, they may be used as a 
helpful instrument to secure military checkpoints and other militarily sensitive 
areas, to deny access to sites of strategic importance and to disperse unruly crowds 
taking to the streets during armed conflict. The fact that non-lethal technology shall 
be primarily deployed as a means of support renders important legal questions 
which will be elaborated in the following chapter. 
67  Update No. 96/1 on ICRC activities in Iraq 1996, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
documents/update/57jn34.htm>, 25th of January 2017. 
68  Fidler, D.,The International Legal Implications, cit., p. 85. 
69  Messingham, E., op. cit., p. 677. 
70  Lewer, N., The Future of Non-Lethal Weapons, cit., p. 29. 
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3.2. Non-Lethal Weapons and the Right to Health 
Apart from humanitarian provisions, human rights also curb and restrain the 
use of non-lethal weapons. While humanitarian provisions apply in armed conflict 
only, human rights may be referred to within and outside the ambit of armed 
conflict.71 In addition to that, most human rights treaties already reflect customary 
law binding not only states,72 which ratified or acceded to international human 
rights treaties but the international community as such.73 This paper will focus on 
health related issues and the deployment of non-lethal weapons. The right to health 
constitutes one of the most complex human rights being interlinked with several 
other obligations, such as the right to freedom from torture and the right to life. 
“Health” can be understood adequately if taking a holistic approach 
encompassing all human needs, starting from access to water, food, sexuality and 
physical integrity.74 “The right to health” could be relevant for the deployment of 
non-lethal weapons in various contexts. First, the right to health enshrines physical 
integrity obligating states parties to abstain from any active measures jeopardizing 
that principle. Second, the right to health enshrines the obligation to guarantee 
adequate medical standards in hospitals to treat injuries caused by non-lethal 
weapons rendering it necessary to actively undertake measures in order to guarantee 
such medical conditions.75 However, the right to health, as any other human right, 
except for those constituting ius cogens, is not absolute. Restrictions on the full 
attainment of the right to health are possible if certain criteria are met, such as 
necessity and proportionality, as in the case of law enforcement.76 Furthermore, 
treaty provisions may be derogated from in case of public emergency. No existing 
treaty entailing a provision on the right to health spares the right from a possible 
derogation.77
71  ICJ, Legality of the use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8th of July 1996.
72  D’Amato, Anthony, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for 
Change of Paradigms, Georgia Journal for International and Comparative Law, 4/1995, pp. 
47 – 61. 
73  With critical remarks see Holning, Lau, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in 
International Human Rights Law, Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 6, 1/2005, p. 
510. 
74  Benedek, Wolfgang, Understanding Human Rights, Wien, Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag 
2012, pp. 150 – 151. 
75  Crowley, M. The Use of Incapacitants in Law Enforcement, in: Casey-Maslen, Stuart (ed.), 
Weapons and International Human Rights Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2016, pp. 374 – 375.
76  Cottier, Thomas et al., The Principle of Proportionality in International Law, Working Paper 
No. 2012/38 December 2012, <http://www.nccrtrade.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccrtrade.
ch/wp3/publications/Proportionality_final_29102012_with_NCCR_coversheet.pdf>, 22nd of 
January, 2017. 
77  Müller, Amrei, The Relationship between Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law, in: O’Flaherty, Michael, Harris, David (eds.), Nottingham 
Studies on Human Rights, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013, p. 138. 
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The first document mentioning the right to health was the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as of 1948 stressing in its Art 25 that “everyone has 
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself 
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond 
his control.”78 In the preamble of its constitution the WHO adopts a much broader 
approach by stating that “health is a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”79 In 1966, the right 
to health was introduced into the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights80 stressing in its Art 12 that “[T]he States Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.” Since the adoption of the 1966 pact, 
several institutions have expressed concern over the use of non-lethal weapons in 
a health related context.81 In 2002, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture warned 
against non-lethal effects and their adverse but still under-researched health effects 
by stating that “chemical agents, such as teargas/irritant munition and pepper spray 
weapons, are said to be promoted as providing effective control without the risk to 
life, i.e. as ‘humane alternatives’ to lethal force. However, according to information 
received, insufficient research has been undertaken into their potential effects on 
targeted persons”.82 Even though the Special Rapporteur’s mandate is to investigate 
incidents potentially inflicting torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, he 
examines health-related issues in context of non-lethal weapons. In 2006, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the right to everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health criticized harshly the conduct of 
force-feeding and drug injections on inmates. From a broad point of view, such 
measures could be equated with non-lethal weapons, being used with almost the 
same intention and causing similar adverse health effects, such as vomiting, nausea 
and disorientation.83 The Rapporteur clarified that the right to health was violated 
when detainees were force-fed or injected with drugs. His reasoning indicates 
that not only states must guarantee sufficient hygienic conditions and adequate 
medical treatment but also have to abstain from measures causing adverse and non-
consensual health effects on detainees in confined spaces.84
78  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 A, 10th of 
December 1948. 
79  Constitution of the World Health Organization, 4th of July 1947. 
80  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16th of December 1966, UNTS vol. 999 
no. 14668.
81  Crowley, M. op cit., pp. 374 – 375. 
82  Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ashma Jahangir, submitted pursuant to Commission on 
Human Rights Resolution, 2002/36, §12. 
83  Crowley, M. op. cit., p. 371. 
84  Provided that these “adverse health“ effects were not absolutely necessary in the concrete 
situation of exposure. This was clearly not the case when people were force-fed or injected 
with drugs. 
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Apart from these general considerations, a right to health in the context of 
non-lethal weapons has not been addressed at the UN level so far.85 However, the 
situation is quite different at the regional level. At the outset, it must be noted that 
neither the European Convention of Human Rights86 (ECHR) nor the Fundamental 
Rights Charter87 (FRC) provide for an own right to health. Instead, the ECHR refers 
to the right to life and the right to freedom from torture, the prohibition of slavery 
and forced labor, as well as the right to freedom and security. However, given the 
significant interconnectedness of the right to health, all these rights could potentially 
affect health issues. Interestingly, the fact that the court takes into consideration 
health related issues with regard to Art 2, 3, 8 and 14 of the ECHR is not a new 
phenomenon. A compound of case law exists, showing in which way the court 
examined health-related issues in different contexts.88 Furthermore, several court 
decisions exist, which are also relevant for the deployment of non-lethal weapons 
and health related issues. In 2010, the ECtHR emphasized the severe health effects 
caused by the use of mustard gas to humans.89 In the case concerned, the applicant 
claimed an infringement of Art 6 and 7 of the ECHR vis-à-vis his home state, the 
Netherlands. Even though the ECHR does not provide explicitly for a right to 
health, the ECtHR seized the opportunity to clarify the adverse health effects of 
chemical weapons. Indeed, the court did not refer to non-lethal weapons but the 
reference to health issues indicates that health is a concern for the court when 
interpreting other rights and obligations. In 2014, the ECtHR dealt with the use of 
TASER-weapons, a non-lethal conducted electrical device discharging electrical 
darts at humans causing incapacitation and immediate muscular paralysis. The court 
did not endorse a right to health per se but it stressed the severe pain caused by 
such technology. In the case concerned, the court saw a violation of Art 3 ECHR 
but it is obvious that health-related issues contributed to the interpretation of Art 
3 in the present case.90 In another judgement, the ECtHR examined the legality of 
the use of pepper spray in custodial centers where inmates reportedly died because 
of prolonged exposure to CS Spray. The court stressed that the use of pepper spray, 
especially in confined spaces, such as custodial centers, poses an imminent risk to 
health and overall well-being capable of causing nausea, vomiting, and respiratory 
problems.91 Even though the court has not addressed non-lethal weapons in a health-
85  Crowley, M. op. cit., p. 371.
86  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4th of November 
1950, UNTS vol. 213, no. 2889.
87  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26th of October 2012, 2012/C, 326/02.
88  See European Court of Human Rights, Health Related Issues in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 2015 <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_health.
pdf>, 18th of January 2017. 
89  ECtHR, Van Anraat vs. the Netherlands, 6th of July 2010 Application No. 65389/09, p.6. 
90  ECtHR, Georgiev and others vs. Bulgaria, European Court of Human Rights, 30st of 
December 2014, Application No. 51284/09, § 32. 
91  ECtHR, Tali vs. Estonia, European Court of Human Rights, 13th of May 2014, Application 
No. 66393/10, § 75 – 76. 
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related context intensively so far, the abovementioned court decisions indicate, that 
the right to health and non-lethal technology will become more and more relevant, 
despite the fact that the ECHR does not provide for an own right to health.92 
Health related issues in connection with the deployment of non-lethal weapons 
have not only been addressed by the ECtHR but also by the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture. In 1994, the committee paid several visits to European 
custodial centers. After a visit to a Spanish prison, the Committee disclosed a report 
criticizing strongly the deployment of non-lethal electronic shock devices in several 
custodial centers.93 In its report issued to the Spanish Government, the CPT not only 
referred to obvious allegations of torture and ill-treatment but it also elaborated the 
various adverse health effects correlating with ill-treatment and torture by providing 
medical information and findings.94 Insofar, even though the Committee itself deals 
exclusively with torture-related offences, health related issues undoubtedly plaid a 
role in its assessment.95
Furthermore, analyzing the right to health in relation to non-lethal weapons 
necessitates having a closer look at the FRC. Unlike the ECHR, the FRC provides 
for an own right to health. Looking at Art 35 more closely unveils that the 
article might not be applicable to non-lethal weapons if one applies a systematic 
interpretation of the FRC.96 The Art is located in chapter IV referring to solidarity. 
The term “solidarity” indicates that rights enshrined in this chapter primarily deal 
with socio-political aspects.97 The use of weapons, on the other side, touches upon 
human dignity, the first chapter of the FRC. Insofar, the rights potentially dealing 
with health-related issues are the same rights that come into play at the level of 
the ECHR: the right to life, freedom from torture and other inhuman or degrading 
treatment. 
In light of the aforementioned it can be concluded, that health related issues 
play a pivotal role when it comes to the protection of human rights and non-lethal 
weapons deployment. Whereas universal institutions are rather reserved when it 
comes to health-related issues and weapon technology, several regional institutions, 
most notably the ECtHR, approve that non-lethal weapons, human rights and health 
are imperatively connected. 
92  Crowley, M., op. cit., pp. 374 – 375. 
93  Spain, Visit 1994, CPT/Inf, 96/9, 21st of September 1994, Facts Found During the Visit and 
Action Proposed
94  Report to the Spanish Government on the visit to Spain carried out by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CPT). 
95  Crowley, M., op. cit., p. 344. 
96  Art 31 VCLT. 
97  Condä, Victor H., A Handbook of Human Rights Terminology, Nebraska, University of 
Nebraska Press, 2004, pp. 242 – 243. 
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4. CONCLUSION
The importance of non-lethal weapons increases steadily. Whether in armed 
conflict, in case of riot control or in custodial centers, non-lethal weapons constitute 
an alternative to lethal force. However, those weapons by no means indicate a 
zero chance of mortality and therefore raise strong humanitarian and human rights 
concerns. As regards humanitarian law, it can be concluded that provisions, such as 
the prohibition to cause superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering, may be eroded 
easily by the invocation of the principle of proportionality. In almost all scenarios, 
where non-lethal weapons come to use, the deployment of such technology may 
be justified on the grounds that military necessity was given in a certain situation 
weighing more than the human suffering caused. However, the invocation of the 
principle of proportionality begs the question, whether there should be a “red line”, 
where the principle must not be referred to because it would clearly contradict 
the object and purpose of the GC. Taking into consideration existing arms control 
treaties and applying a systemic interpretation according to Art 31 para 2 lit 
c VCLT, it could be argued that arms control treaties absolutely condemning 
certain weapons, are at the same time weapons causing unnecessary suffering and 
superfluous injuries, where the invocation of the principle of proportionality would 
defeat the very purpose of the GC. According to international law, most notably 
the VCLT, it is not necessary that arms control treaties explicitly condemn weapons 
causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injuries. Arms control treaties as such 
pursue the same overall purpose of protecting civilians in armed conflict as the GC. 
Insofar, arms control treaties may be referred to in order to perceive the “red line”, 
where the principle of proportionality must not be invoked anymore. When it comes 
to the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, it can be concluded that the principle 
of proportionality cannot be invoked in all scenarios. Especially the prohibition 
of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, a principle constituting a peremptory 
norm of PIL, must be taken into account. In case of conflict with this principle, legal 
provisions contradicting or infringing upon the prohibition of torture, degrading 
or inhuman treatment are void and cannot be invoked. A case-by-case assessment 
will have to be conducted in order to evaluate, which weapons would violate the 
prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.
As regards human rights, it must be noted that the right to health has not 
been addressed by authors in a non-lethal context so far. However, especially the 
recent jurisprudence by the ECtHR reveals that health-related issues play an ever 
important role when it comes to the protection of human rights. Even though 
the ECHR does not enshrine an own “right to health”, health has influenced the 
interpretation of other human rights, most notably the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment. This is of particular importance for non-lethal 
weapons. States’ increasing interest in non-lethal technology necessitates addressing 
these issues carefully. Even though not all problems can be solved by analyzing 
non-lethal weapons from the perspective of PIL, it contributes significantly to the 
protection of humans, both within and outside the ambit of armed conflict. 
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Sažetak
NESMRTONOSNO ORUŽJE: NAČELO RAZMJERNOSTI 
U ORUŽANOM SUKOBU I PRAVO NA ZDRAVLJE U 
POLICIJSKIM POSTUPANJIMA
Kada se govori o oružju, obično se pod njime podrazumijeva primjena smr-
tonosne tehnologije. S druge strane, u i izvan oružanih sukoba, često se koristi i tzv. 
nesmrtonosno oružje, kojemu svrha nije ubijanje, već oneposobljavanje pojedinaca 
ili vojnih ciljeva. Budući da nesmrtonosno oružje ne mora nužno uzrokovati smrt, 
ali uzrokuje ozbiljna ranjavanja i velike patnje, korištenje takvih sredstava otvara 
brojna humanitarna pitanja i pitanja zaštite ljudskih prava.
Zabrana uzrokovanja suvišnih ozljeda i nepotrebne patnje, kao i zabrana 
neselektivnih napada su jedne od najznačajnijih zabrana u međunarodnom ratnom 
pravu, a koje se mogu primijeniti i na korištenje nesmrtonosnog oružja u oružanom 
sukobu. Međutim, primjena načela razmjernosti može dovesti do opravdavanja 
korištenja nesmrtonosnog oružja. To se opravdava očekivanim prednostima njegove 
primjene u oružanom sukobu, koje pretežu u odnosu na uzrokovane ljudske patnje. 
Stoga se postavlja pitanje postoji li „crvena linija“ njegove primjene. Učestalo 
pozivanje na primjenu načela razmjernosti može poništiti cilj i svrhu Ženevskih 
konvencija te dovesti do opravdavanja nezakonitog korištenja nesmrtonosnog 
oružja.
Osim u oružanim sukobima, nesmrtonosno se oružje može koristiti i u policij-
skim postupanjima. U tim slučajevima osobito značenje ima zaštita ljudskih prava. 
Pri tomu se u obzir ne smije uzeti samo zabrana mučenja i uzrokovanja nečovječnih 
ili ponižavajućih patnji te pravo na život, već i pravo na zdravlje. Pravo na zdravlje 
ograničava i postavlja granice uporabe nesmrtonosnog oružja izvan okvira oružanog 
sukoba.
Ključne riječi: humanitarno pravo, zaštita ljudskih prava, razoružanje.
*  Elisabeth Hoffberger, asistentica, Institute of Public International Law, Air Law and 
International Relations, Johannes Kepler University, Austrija; elisabeth.hoffberger@jku.at
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Zusammenfassung
NICHT TÖDLICHE WAFFEN: 
PROPORTIONALITÄTSGRUNDSATZ IM BEWAFFNETEN 
KONFLIKT UND RECHT AUF GESUNDHEIT BEI DER 
RECHTSDURCHSETZUNG
Wenn man an Waffen denkt, denkt man für gewöhnlich an ihre letale 
Technologie. Heutzutage aber wird eine Fülle nicht tödlicher Waffen, welche eine 
Person oder ein militärisches Ziel kampfunfähig machen aber sie nicht töten sollten, 
sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb des Rahmens eines bewaffneten Konfliktes 
benutzt. Da der Einsatz nicht tödlicher Waffen trotzdem tödliche Konsequenzen 
haben kann und oft zu schweren Wunden oder zu unnötigem Leiden führt, ruft 
die Verwendung solcher Waffen große Sorgen im Bereich des humanitären 
Völkerrechtes und der Menschenrechte hervor. 
Das Verbot des Verursachens überflüssiger Wunden und unnötigen Leidens sowie 
das Verbot wahlloser Angriffe stellen unter anderem die relevantesten Bestimmungen, 
welche den Einsatz nicht tödlicher Waffen in einem bewaffneten Konflikt potentiell 
beeinflussen können. Die Berufung auf den Proportionalitätsgrundsatz aber könnte 
den Einsatz nicht tödlicher Waffen rechtfertigen, mit der Begründung, dass der 
erwartete militärische Vorteil größer als das verursachte menschliche Leiden sei. 
Insofern stellt sich die Frage, ob es eine rote Linie gibt, beziehungsweise, ob die fast 
inflationäre Berufung auf den Proportionalitätsgrundsatz den Gegenstand und Zweck 
der Genfer Konventionen überwältigen und den Einsatz nicht tödlicher Waffen als 
rechtswidrig erklären könnte. 
Neben dem Schlachtfeld werden nicht tödliche Waffen auch in Szenarien der 
Rechtsdurchsetzung eingesetzt, wo Menschenrechte eine zentrale Rolle spielen. In 
dieser Hinsicht sollte man nicht nur das Verbot der Folter und unmenschlicher oder 
erniedrigender Behandlung und das Recht auf Leben in Betracht ziehen, sondern 
auch das Recht auf Gesundheit, vermutlich ein unterschätzter Grundsatz, welcher 
den Einsatz nicht tödlicher Waffen außerhalb des Rahmens eines bewaffneten 
Konfliktes beschränkt und gestaltet. 
Schlüsselwörter: humanitäres Völkerrecht, Menschenrechte, Abrüstung. 
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Riassunto
ARMI NON LETALI: IL PRINCIPIO DI PROPORZIONALITÀ 
NEI CONFLITTI ARMATI ED IL DIRITTO ALLA SALUTE 
NELL’USO DELLE FORZE DELL’ORDINE 
Solitamente quando si pensa alle armi, si pensa a tecnologie belliche letali. 
Tuttavia, un’abbondante quantità di c.d. armi non letali derivanti dallo sviluppo 
di tecnologie non volte all’uccisione, bensì alla mera neutralizzazione di obiettivi 
umani od obiettivi militari, viene dispiegata nel contesto di conflitti armati, 
come anche al di fuori degli stessi. Posto che le armi non letali non implicano 
necessariamente una chance pari a zero di mortalità, bensì spesso comportano 
ferite gravi e sofferenze atroci, l’uso ed il dispiego di tali armi provoca serie 
preoccupazioni sul piano umanitario e dei diritti umani. 
Il divieto di causare ferite inutili e sofferenze non necessarie, come pure il 
divieto di attacchi indiscriminati rappresentano, tra le molte, le disposizioni più 
rilevanti che potenzialmente potrebbero sortire un’influenza sul dispiego delle 
armi da tecnologie non letali nei conflitti armati. Peraltro, il richiamo al principio 
di proporzionalità può indurre alla giustificazione dell’uso di armi non letali sulla 
base della motivazione che il vantaggio militare realizzato sia maggiore rispetto alla 
sofferenza umana causata. Benché uno debba interrogarsi se ci sia una “linea rossa”, 
come pure dove l’inflazionato richiamo al principio di proporzionalità possa battere 
l’oggetto ed il fine delle Convenzioni di Ginevra e per l’effetto rendere il dispiego e 
l’uso della tecnologia non letale illegale.
Lasciando in disparte il campo di battaglia, le armi non letali vengono altresì 
dispiegate in interventi delle forze dell’ordine, dove i diritti umani hanno un ruolo 
predominante. A tale proposito, non si deve guardare esclusivamente al divieto 
di torture e di sofferenze inumane o degradanti rispetto al diritto alla vita, bensì 
anche al diritto alla salute, e cioè un diritto presumibilmente sottostimato forgiante 
e formativo dell’uso di tecnologie non letali fuori dall’ambito dei conflitti armati. 
Parole chiave: diritto umanitario, diritti umani, Disarmamento. 
